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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UT AH
VINTON G. STEINER, MARJORIE
STEINER, and KIMALA STEINER,
a minor child, by and through
her Guardian ad Litem VINTON
G. STEINER
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through the Utah State Road
Commission, and Department
of Public Highways, and NEPHI
CfIT CORPORATION, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah,
Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No.

12531

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF UTAH,
BY AND THROUGH THE UTAH STATE ROAD
COMMISSION AND DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HIGHWAYS

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries arising out of
an auto-pedestrian accident.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's separate motions to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint were granted December 12, 1968 by the Honor.
able C. Nelson Day, District Judge. No appeal was taken
therefrom. Thereafter on December 12, 1969, plaintiff
filed a "Second Amended Complaint" in the same case.
Defendants again filed independent motions to dismiss
which were granted by the Honorable J. Harlan Burns,
District Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This respondent seeks affirmance of the trial Court's .
Order of Dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident out of which this cause arose occurred
September 29, 1967. The alleged manner in which the
accident occurred is unimportant for purposes of this
appeal.
Plaintiff filed a complaint September 27, 1968, alleg·
ing negligence and naming The State of Utah, by and
through the Utah State Road Commission, and Depart·
ment of Public Highways (hereinafter referred to as The
State of Utah), and Nephi City as co-defendants. A Motion
to Dismiss was filed on behalf of the State of Utah because
of failure to comply with the provisions of the Utah Gov·
ernmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-12 and 19, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. On November 12, 1968, and ap· ,
parently prior to the hearing on defendants' Motions ro
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Dismiss, which were heard at 10:00 o'clock A.M. on the
same day (R. 46, 48-49), the plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint, and a personal undertaking in the sum of
$300.00 which amount was arbitrarily determined by the
plaintiffs, and not fixed by the Court as required by the
statute (63-30-19 U.C.A., 1953 as amended). The record
does not reflect that it was ever served, or that any action
was taken with respect to the same prior to dismissal.
The Honorable C. Nelson Day, after hearing arguments and considering memoranda submitted by counsel, executed an Order on December 12, 1968, dismissing
the action as to the State of Utah (R. 46). An order was
also executed the same day dismissing the defendant Nephi
City Corporation (R. 48-49). The dismissal orders were
filed December 16, 1968 (R. 46, 48-49).
The plaintiffs did not file a motion to alter or amend
the orders; nor was an appeal taken therefrom.
A full year later on December 12, 1969, plaintiffs
filed what they denominated a Second Amended Complaint in the same action (R. 50-54). In response thereto
separate motions to dismiss were filed on behalf of the
State of Utah and Nephi City, upon the grounds, among
others, that the order of December 12, 1968, dismissing
the action operated as an adjudication of the matter. Arguments in support of those motions were heard by the
Honorable James P. McCune, District Judge, on April
17, 1970, who failed to rule upon the same prior to the
expiration of his term of office. Thereafter arguments in
support of the said motions were heard by the Honorable
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]. Harlan Burns, District Judge, on February 1, 1971 (R.
83). Orders granting the motions to dismiss as to both
defendants were granted on the 12th of April, 1971.
Plaintiffs then filed a "Motion for Rehearing" 00
April 19, 1971, and arguments were presented by counsel
to the Court, J. Harlan Burns, Judge, presiding May 3,
1971. Appropriate orders denying plaintiffs' motion for
rehearing were granted by the court on May 6, 1971 (R.
93-95). Appeal followed May 20, 1971 (R. 97).
ARGUMENT
POINTS I and II
Points I and II of Appellant's Brief are directed '
toward the application and interpretation of Section IQ.
7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which requires the fil.
ing of claims against a municipal corporation within
thirty days of the date of the accident. These are directed
against the co-defendant Nephi City Corporation and do
not involve the State of Utah. For this reason this respond·
ent defers response thereto to co-defendant and respond·
ent.
POINT III
THE COURT'S ORDER OF DECEMBER 12,
1968, DISMISSING THE ACTION PRECLUD·
ED THE FILING OF AN AMENDED COM·
PLAINT IN THE SAME ACTION ONE YEAR
LATER.
Following the arguments presented November 12.
1968, in support of the Motions to Dismiss, the trial judge
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stated that the Motions should be granted. However, he
allowed the plaintiffs' counsel 15 days within which to
file a memorandum in opposition. At that hearing plainciffs' counsel stated:
"Your Honor, I would like to have it clearly
understood that in granting the State's motion to
dismiss does not bar us from refiling our claim."
[sic]. (Transcript of Hearing November 12, 1968,
page 2).
The Court stated:
"As to the State, you can refile as to them,
and take the suggestions we have talked about here
this morning, I am not going to prevent you from
doing that." (Transcript page 4) (Emphasis added).
Thus, the plaintiffs' counsel clearly understood that
the contemplated ruling of the court would have the effect of dismissing the action; which he acknowledged in
Appellant's Brief, at page 6.
We believe that a fair reading of the court's oral
statements from the bench, as well as the order of dismissal entered December 12, 1968 (R. 46), constituted a
dismissal without prejudice insofar as the State of Utah
was concerned (See Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure).
Following dismissal, the parties "are out of court for
every purpose other than to carry the order of dismissal
into effect." 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Dismissal, Sec. 72, p. 61.
However, the court does have the right to alter or amend
an order of dismissal, or, in certain circumstances to re-
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lieve a party from a judgment or order. Rules 59 (e), 60,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Bales v. Brome, 56 Wyo.
111, 105 P.2d 568.
In the absence of a statute, and where the answer
seeks no affirmative relief, as in the case at bar, a
dismissal or nonsuit leaves the situation as if the suit had
never been filed. See Annotation, 11 A.L.R. 2d, 1407.
The order of dismissal entered by the court consti·
tuted a final judgment. Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Plaintiffs did not seek to alter or amend the Order
as permitted by Rule 59(e), or to be relieved of the same
for any of the reasons enumerated by Rule 60, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure; nor was relief sought by a timely ap·
peal.
Following the entry of the order dismissing the ac·
tion, the plaintiffs could not revive the same by filing a
Second Amended Complaint. The action was dismissed and
no longer existed. In the absence of an appropriate valid
court order altering, amending, or setting aside the dis·
missal or relieving plaintiffs from the effect thereof, the
action could not be reinstated. If plaintiffs desired to pro·
ceed with their cause it was necessary to "re-file" by com·
mencing a new action, as the court had plainly suggested.
The plaintiffs claim that they were given permission
to file an "amended complaint." This assumption should
have been totally dispelled upon entry of the Orders dis·
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missing the claim, without qualification, a month following the hearing. In any event the final Order of the Court
is controlling in cases where there may be ambiguity or
uncertainty concerning the meaning of the judge's comments or informal rulings.
In the case of l\1cCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311,

I
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241 P.2d 468, 472, the appellant claimed on appeal that
he was misled by the court into not presenting all of his
evidence when the trial court indicated that he was going
to rule for him, and then after the matter was submitted
changed his mind. In rejecting this claim, the court stated:
"The fact that the trial court changed his mind
and entered a judgment contrary to his orally announced decision at the time the case was submitted, cannot be a basis for overturning the judgment. The only judgment that can be given effect
is the one entered in accordance with law.... No
antecedent expressions of the judge can in any way
restrict his absolute power to declare his final conclusion, in the only manner authorized by law,
to-wit, by filing his 'decision' ....
"Oral statements of opinion by the trial court
inconsistent with the findings and conclusions ultimately rendered, do not affect the final judgment
(Citing cases)."
In Newton v. State Road Commission, 23 U.2d 350,
463 P.2d 565, 566, the court stated:

" ... Statements and observations of the trial
court in discussing the evidence do not bind him,
nor do they limit his prerogative of finally making
up his mind, and they are superseded by the formal
written findings and Judgment."
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See also Wheat v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 122
Utah 418, 250 P. 2d 932.
If the plaintiffs disagreed with the order of dismissal
as entered by the court, the Rules of Procedure offered
several alternatives. Since the court did not thereafter
modify or amend the same, and the plaintiffs did not
appeal therefrom, the judgment of dismissal became final
and could not be revived by the simple act of filing a ,
Second Amended Complaint.
1

POINT IV
A FORMAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL EXECUTED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE AND FILED
WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT IS CONTROLLING IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSEQUENT ORDER MODIFYING OR SETTING
ASIDE THE SAME.
The formal order dismissing the plaintiffs' action,
as to the State of Utah, entered December 12, 1968,
constituted the court's order and established the law of
the case. It controlled all subsequent matters pertaining
to the case. As we have seen previously, the dismissal
served to terminate the entire action as though it had not
been filed, except that the court could have entertained
appropriate motions concerning the same had they been
timely filed. No such action was undertaken by the plain·
tiffs. Judge Burns, by granting defendants' motions to
dismiss the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, which
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was filed in the original action, was an affirmation of the
decision theretofore made by his predecessor, Judge C.
Nelson Day. His action did not constitute a breach of
judicial discretion as suggested by plaintiffs. He merely
applied the law and gave effect to the prior lawful order
of the court. Judge Burns had no alternative but to honor
the prior order of dismissal, and to deny the plaintiffs'
attempt to revive the action by filing a "Second Amended
Complaint."
CONCLUSION
The court's order of December 12, 1968, served to
dismiss the plaintiffs' action. The plaintiffs had the right
under the prevailing rules to seek an amendment of, or
relief from the order, or to commence a new action, which
latter procedure was suggested to their counsel by the
trial judge. The plaintiffs were not in any way misled
because their counsel acknowledged at the first hearing
that the effect of the court's contemplated order was to
dismiss the action. He gained clarification from the court
that a dismissal would be without prejudice to his right
to "refile," which he failed to do.
The final order of dismissal, as executed by the trial
judge, is controlling. Comments made by the trial judge
during the course of argument indicating the action which
he anticipated to take were superseded by the final order.
The plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain that
another Judge gave effect to that Order by dismissing
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their Second Amended Complaint, when they attempted
to file the same in a cause which had been previously dis.
missed.
The ruling of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
and MERLIN R. LYBBERT
Attorneys for Respondents The State of
Utah, by and through the
Utah State Road Commission and
Department of Public Highways
7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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